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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
consented to the status of managing agent. The statute requires that a certificate
designating a managing agent bear the consent of the designee.19 In deciding
that the provision requiring designation of a managing agent applies to the de-
fendant, the court deprives him of his opportunity to decline the responsibility
of that position. At the sentencing of the defendant his attorney presented the
proposition that defendant had been made the dupe of unscrupulous owners.
20
The present decision might have the effect of fostering this practice. Of course
the defendant's status as a person responsible for a multiple dwelling was not
disputed and ample evidence of his agency was presented in the trial court, but
it is not certain that he would have accepted the position if he had been fully
aware of the responsibility involved. By the present decision the agent is deprived
of notice of his official responsibility. The Court sought to make a responsible
person available to city law enforcement officials. It must be wondered if this
purpose has been, or will be accomplished. The true owners remain unscathed
while the defendant suffers the penalty of law. It is doubtful that he is capable
of remedying the unhealthy conditions, the elimination of which is the ultimate
goal of the statute. The true owners are no more constrained to do so than
before.
Albert Dolata
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AUTHORIZED AS INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST DESPITE
FAILURE TO STATE AUTHORITY AND CAUSE
On June 25, 1960, a jewelry story in New York City was burglarized.
Approximately two months later the FBI relayed information to the New York
Police indicating that a certain Joseph Coffey was one of the burglars and
that he would be attempting to sell some of the plunder on August 30 at a
certain street corner in Brooklyn. After being briefed at FBI Headquarters,
the two New York detectives accompanied the agents to the designated street
corner where they saw Coffey and two other men get into a car. After following
this car for a time and seeing one passenger disembark, the FBI agents ordered
an arrest. The detectives thereupon approached the car and took Coffey and
his passenger into custody. The officers had neither a search nor arrest warrant.
A search of Coffey's passenger yielded an envelope containing diamonds. At
the trial of Coffey for third degree burglary these diamonds were introduced into
evidence despite the defendant's objections. Coffey was convicted of third
degree burglary. While this conviction was being appealed to the Court of
Appeals of New York, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its
historic Mapp v. Ohio' decision. Thereafter evidence gathered as a result of
an unconstitutional search and seizure was to be excluded in state as well as
19. New York City Administrative Code § D26-3.1 (1955).
20. Record pp. 97-106.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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federal courts., The Court of Appeals of New York, when first faced with the
Coffey Appeal, held that the new Mapp rule would apply even though it was
promulgated subsequent to Coffey's conviction. 2 The opinion included a
statement to the effect that, if this search were incident to a legal arrest, the
evidence would be receivable. The court then ordered a hearing to be held in
the Court of General Sessions to determine if the motion to suppress should
be granted.3 The hearing revealed that the FBI's information was received
from an informer with whom it had dealt in the past. The FBI learned from
other officers that Coffey had a criminal record and frequently drove a car
answering the description of the getaway car. At the time of Coffey's arrest
he was driving this same car. The name of the informer -was kept secret during
the hearing despite the objection of defense counsel. The hearing also revealed
that Coffey was not explicitly informed by the officers of the cause of his arrest.
The Court of General Sessions denied the motion to suppress and this decision
was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals in a 6 to 1
decision through Chief Judge Desmond upheld the denial of the motion to
suppress and affirmed the conviction. The information received by the officers
from both the informer and other sources gave the officers probable cause to
arrest the defendant. The search and seizure was therefore valid as incident
to a lawful arrest. Refusal to divulge the identity of the informer in a hearing
on a motion to suppress is not error unless by making a fair hearing impossible
it seriously prejudices the defense. When the unnamed informer is a mere
transmitter of information and not a competent witness to the crime itself
and there is strong proof of the accuracy of his information, nondisclosure is
appropriate. Circumstances, including the fruits of the search, justified the con-
clusion that the defendant must have known the cause of his arrest. This is
sufficient notice to meet the statutory requirement in cases of arrest without
warrant. People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 182 N.E.2d 92, 237 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1963).
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution has guaranteed that
the people are to be secure in their persons and homes from unreasonable
searches and seizures.4 In order to conduct a search, the police, with few ex-
ceptions, must possess a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable
cause.5 The basic element of all definitions of probable cause is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt.6 The evidence supporting that belief can be less
than evidence which would support a conviction.7 In the course of the search,
officers may seize instrumentalities by which a crime is committed, fruits of the
crime (i.e., stolen property), weapons by which escape might be effected, or
2. See People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.YS.2d 462 (1961).
3. People v. Coffey, 11 N.Y.2d 142, 182 N.E.2d 92, 227 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1962); See
generally 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 113 (1962).
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
6. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
7. Ibid.
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property, the possession of which is a crime.8 An automobile is no more vul-
nerable to illegal searches than is a home.9 Probable cause must likewise be
shown' and the affidavits supporting the application must be equally explicit. 1
In no case can the fruits of an illegal search be used to justify the later issue of
a warrant.' 2 Informer information corroborated by the officers own personal
knowledge will generally justify a finding of probable cause.'8 Independent
corroboration may not be necessary where the informer has proved reliable
in the past.14 But where information is neither corroborated nor from a reliable
source, it is insufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.1'5 The identity of the informer need not be disclosed unless nondis-
closure would be fundamentally unfair.1
There are two general exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant.
A warrantless search may be legal if it is consented to' 7 or if it. is incident to a
lawful arrest.' 8 This latter exception is an ever widening exception to the re-
quirement of a judicial warrant.19 In the case of a warrantless arrest, where no
crime has been committed, the police officer must have reasonable cause to believe
that the arrestee has committed a felony.20 Statutes governing such arrests
should be strictly construed.2 ' The probable cause necessary to obtain a search
warrant is indistinguishable from the probable cause which will justify an
arrest and search incidental thereto.22 There is evidence of lack of probable
cause if the officer fails to get a search warrant when such acquisition was prac-
ticable.23 The arrest and search are not justified by what they turn up.2 4 The
search cannot be justified by the arrest, when the arrest in turn must be
justified by the fruits of the search 5 The search must be made after the
arrest2" and only if the arrest is lawful.27 If the search does not comply with
8. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
9. See People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960).
10. See United States v. Spears, 287 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1961).
11. See United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960).
12. See Silverthorns Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
13. See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Hamer v. United States, 259
F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958).
14. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
15. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
16. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Compare King v. United States,
282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
17. See United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
935 (1954); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
18. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
19. See Day & Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Exani-
nation in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 56 (1961).
20. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177.
21. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
22. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See generally Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
23. United States v. One Ford, 265 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Kancso,
252 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1958).
24. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
25. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1947).
26. See Lee v. United States, 232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
27. State v. Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 422, 357 P.2d 735 (1961).
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these standards, the federal exclusionary rule is applicable2 8 and a motion to
suppress the evidence29 will be granted.
The Court in the instant case has accepted as amply justified the lower
court's determination that the officers had probable cause for arrest. In so
doing they emphasize that the informer was not the sole source of information.
The agents had checked on the history and the record of the .accused and his
associates. In so doing they learned that defendant was known to drive a car
answering the description of the getaway car. This knowledge was reaffirmed
when the defendant appeared on the night of his arrest driving that same car.
The Court, however, had yet to justify the fact that the prosecution was per-
mitted to keep secret the name of the informer. In disposing of the defendant's
claim that there might not even be an informer, the Court holds that the testi-
mony of the FBI agent as well as that of the prosecuting attorney is adequate
proof that an informer did exist.30 They go on to point out that the principal
elements of the informer's story were checked out and found plausible and that
this eliminated any danger which could result should an informer merely
attempt to sell tavern rumor. Relying on the conclusion that the informer was
a mere transmitter of information and not in any sense a competent witness to
the crime, the Court held that nondisclosure of his identity was appropriate in
order to protect the flow of information to the police authorities. The final
point considered was the statutory requirement that an officer, in making an
arrest, give notice both of his authority and the cause for arrest, except where
the party is at the time committing a felony or is under hot pursuit. 1 The
Court held that, even though the requirement was not explicitly met, the sur-
rounding circumstances, including the possession of the jewels, indicated that
defendant must have been aware of the reason for his arrest, and in this way
was under sufficient notice.
The Court in the instant case notes parenthetically that probably the
principal question on this appeal involves the withholding of the informer's
identity. Judge Fuld, in dissent, likewise centers on that aspect of the case
in urging reversal of the conviction. The majority, however, has simplified
this issue by sustaining the trial judge's contention that sufficient information
existed exclusive of the informer to establish probable cause for arrest. Assuming
this to be true, the majority is in accord with federal authorities when it allows
the prosecution the privilege of withholding the informer's identity. 2 Having
found adequate probable cause for arrest, the Court still had to justify the
method of arrest. The officers had failed to give Coffey notice of their authority
and cause of arrest as required by statute. If this rendered the arrest illegal,
28. See People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
29. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813(e).
30. Compare King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
31. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180.
32. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Sorrentino v. United
States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
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then the resulting search was likewise illegal. To avoid this conclusion the Court
relies at least partially on the fact that the search uncovered the jewels. The
validity of this reasoning is highly doubtful. Failure to comply with statutory
requirements for arrest has rendered arrests illegal and unlawful. 33 The two
requirements then for a legal arrest in this case were probable cause and com-
pliance with the statutory provision of notice of authority and cause. All author-
ities agree that the fruits of the search could not be used to supply probable
cause for the underlying arrest.34 If the fruits cannot be used to fulfill one pred-
icate of a legal arrest, i.e., probable cause, they should not be used to justify
the presumption that the defendant knew his cause of arrest. A search and
arrest should not be permitted to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps in
any manner. 5
George P. Doyle
WAIVER oF TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree, assault in the second
degree, carnal abuse of a child, and endangering the life, health and morals
of a child. The case had given rise to some emotional newspaper commentary
in which the defendant was described as a "sex monster," and a "molester of
dozens of children." The defendant believed that because of this notoriety he
could not obtain a fair jury trial,' and thus he moved, on the authority of a
1938 amendment to Article I, section 2 of the New York Constitution, to waive
trial by jury.2 The motion was denied, and the defendant subsequently was
convicted on all counts. He appealed, assigning as error the denial of this motion.
The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, granting the People
permission to appeal. Held, in a four-three decision, that where a waiver of
trial by jury is requested in good faith, the court, if confident that the defendant
fully understands the consequences of his act, must then grant the waiver as a
matter of right. People v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 190 N.E.2d 17, 239 N.Y.S.2d
670 (1963).
At common law, those accused of a felony could not waive the right to trial
by jury.3 While neither the courts nor the legislatures have generally distin-
33. People v. Gallo, 206 Misc. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1954).
See also Egan v. State, 255 App. Div. 825, 7 N.Y.S.2d 64 (4th Dep't 1938); People v.
Dontz, 282 App. Div. 993, 125 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1953).
34. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581 (1948).
35. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Compare Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
1. People v. Duchin, 16 A.D.2d 483, 229 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1962).
2. The relevant language of Article I, section 2, reads as follows: "A jury trial
may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime
charged may be punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in
person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court havingjurisdiction to try the offense."
3. Lord Dacres Case, Kelyng's R. 59, Crown Cases 89 (reign of Henry VIII, jury
